Is Operation Just Cause truly Just?
Sofía Espino
Introduction
The US invasion of Panama in 1989, better known as “Operation Just Cause”, was meant to restore freedoms and democracy in Panama through the capture of dictator General Manuel Antonio Noriega by American military forces (Britannica, 2025). An operation that sought to stabilize the political situation of a country led by a de facto military regime, ended up condemned as a violation of international law, caused major civilian deaths and left the country in a shattered political and socio-economic situation. This narrative is barely acknowledged. The US invasion of Panama, the most violent conflict in Panamanian history and the largest American military intervention after the Vietnam War (Gilboa, 1996), remains almost forgotten in history. From an American perspective, Operation Just Cause was a successful operation that served as a “training experience” for the US administration (Miller Center, n.d.), such as the first Gulf War a year later. A comparatively low-cost and short operation, it set the example of democratic restoration in Latin America. This maximalist military strategy made military interventions more attractive than diplomacy and gained domestic popularity (Hinman, 2025).
However, as briefly mentioned above, the negative costs of war seem to be forgotten by the American perspective. This concept of American narratives of war can be related to Kathy Ferguson’s “Oh Say, Can You See – The Semiotics of Military in Hawaii”. Although this reading focuses on the militarized culture of Hawaii, it aims to “link Hawaii with other colonized islands in the Pacific” (Ferguson, 1999). Panama is not a colony anymore, but it has been under strong American influence since 1904. The Panama Canal has shaped US-Panama relations under a modern Monroe Doctrine. Thus, war narratives and militarization can be applied to Operation Just Cause because official records framed the intervention as urgent and triumphant while normalizing regional imperialism and the use of force in sovereign Latin American states.
The author mentions claims about the military in Hawaii that also apply to the Panamanian case. First, military order is a model of authority and any alternative order is perceived as messy. Despite Noriega’s dictatorship being a military order, it was opposite to the American way of order and governance. The following claim addresses the normalization of the military due to naturalization and reassurance. Military presence was justified as a necessity to protect American assets, almost as if Panamanian national security depended on foreign military aid, a connection to the final claim about a masked bribery through the narrative of reassurance. In Chapter 5 “Seeing as Believing at the Arizona Memorial”, the reading offers an exhaustive case study of militarization in Hawaii through the Pearl Harbor Memorial, a constant reminder of the heroic war narrative portrayed by the US military. Operation Just Cause highlights a different approach to American war narratives, those beyond permanent military spaces or colonized territories, shifting the focus towards short-term military operations in sovereign countries. To further enhance these ideas, the essay will go through the official US timeline that led to Operation Just Cause; a critical analysis from alternative narratives; the role of media; and, the social costs diminished in mainstream perspectives.
Official US Narrative
Manuel Noriega rose to power after the death of former military leader, Omar Torrijos. Shortly after, he became a paid informant to the CIA (Britannica, 2025). With the Iran-Contra scandal, the United States turned to Noriega, supporter of the rebels in Nicaragua, for intelligence and seizure of narcotics (COHA, 2008). However, the dictator sold confidential CIA information and became involved in drug smuggling. The United States formally charged him with drug trafficking and money laundering. By then, Noriega was the General of the Panamanian Army and had nullified the 1989 presidential elections (COHA, 2008). In December of 1989 the National Assembly had appointed him as “maximum leader” of Panama, months after a coup attempt to overthrow the general. In his inauguration speech, Noriega declared a state of war between the United States and Panama and attacked four unarmed US Marines, killing one of them (Britannica, 2025).
Exiting President Reagan and incoming President Bush opted for non-military measures to deescalate the situation. Despite their efforts, tensions between both countries had escalated and President Bush ordered military deployment, which happened on December 20, 1989 (Britannica, 2025). Noriega surrendered to American forces in January, 1980 and was convicted in US courts. Guillermo Endara, the elected president from the annulled elections, was sworn in on December, 20. The Panamanian Defense Forces were dismantled and the United States provided economic aid to restore damaged infrastructure. According to official sources about 500 Panamanian people died, including civilians and soldiers, while 23 US soldiers were also killed (Britannica, 2025).
This official narrative from the American perspective, makes military force a vital decision to safeguard American interests in Panama. Noriega’s connection to narco trafficking made him a clear enemy, specifically to a Canal soon-to-be transferred to Panamanian authorities. For instance, President Reagan offered a drop in charges if he resigned but denied the proposal. General Noriega’s lack of compliance ultimately forced the United States to intervene, as seen through his declaration of state of war.
Although there is no memorial to represent American success for this military operation, the United States has framed Operation Just Cause as something that had to happen to bring stability to a fragile democracy. This “heroic” act is constantly normalized that it is not even considered as an infringement of sovereignty, but rather a necessity. Panama, Hawaii and other Pacific islands all require a divine power to protect them from evil, including themselves and their own ways of governance. Any form of authority contrary to the American order must be disbanded as it threatens American hegemonic power.
Regarding Panamanian official narratives, US-backed President Endara supported the operation by claiming it was necessary to remove Noriega to secure Panamanian democracy. Nowadays, the framing has shifted to a more nationalistic approach that acknowledges the social costs and shared trauma, commemorating December 20th as a national day of mourning. In 2006, the Panamanian government created a commission to investigate civilian deaths during the invasion, raising awareness about the many unreported deaths from bothAmerican and Panamanian records. In spite of this, Panama remains as one of the United States’ strongest allies in Latin America, with many locals still grateful for Operation Just Cause.
Alternative Narratives and Critical Analysis
Consequently, official narratives have been criticized as many aspects of Operation Just Cause remain under the shadows. Starting with Noriega’s drug smuggling, the United States was aware of his crimes but willing to ignore them, as long as he complied with American interests. As a CIA asset, Noriega had working ties with Bush that had to be severed to avoid further scrutiny prior to the elections. Since his indictment, US government officials were already drafting plans to overthrow Noriega. During the failed coup of October 1989, the Southern Command ordered “to remove Noriega to a U.S. military base if that could be done, effectively, if successful, fixing the Noriega problem at that time” (COHA, 2008), which had also failed as forces loyal to the military leader rescued him. Thus, it can be argued that President Bush had to find a definite solution to the issue to regain domestic support; Operation Just Cause was not a last resort but rather a long-term calculated strategy.
The objective of restoring democracy has also been under criticism as it is argued the United States seeked to install a regime that would be influenced by an American agenda (Beluche, 2017). The surrender of Noriega came along with the dismantling of the Panamanian Defense Forces, an extension to the military regime. The defense forces came to existence after strong support from the Pentagon to create a national security force that would protect the Canal (Beluche, 2017), but the forces’ affiliation to the dictatorship made their dismantlement a logical measure to overthrow the regime.
International organizations have some relevance on the matter, with the Organization of American States (OAS), as the main advocate for self-determination and non-intervention. The OAS sent a diplomatic envoy after the annulled elections to oversee a peaceful transition of power. Despite their failed efforts, the organization continued to reject American military intervention. But the United States had already decided to use force to prevent further chaos, while regaining Bush’s domestic popularity. Even so, they cited Article 21 of the OAS Charter in favor of using military force only in cases of “self-defense in accordance with existing treaties” (United States General Accounting Office, 1991), which would be the Panama Canal Treaty. Ultimately, an OAS resolution condemned the invasion stating it was an unproportionate measure that violated territorial integrity.
These alternative narratives strengthen the connection to Ferguson’s text because militarization produces hegemonic power that comes in the shape of capitalism, colonialism and western influence (Ferguson, 1999). The Panamanian military was created to fulfill American military goals without foreign intervention (Beluche, 2017). But their loyalty to Noriega’s regime made them a threat. The United States could not take down the dictatorship without dismantling its defense forces. Democracy was used as a justification for intervening in domestic affairs, without acknowledging pleas from regional and internationalorganizations. Using unilateral force, taking down Noriega, and dismantling the military was a form of bribery to guarantee an American-like authority.
Media Framing
Before the invasion, American media was highlighting Bush’s administration deficiency in solving the Panamanian crisis, hindering his reelection campaign. It might be argued that pressure from the media was key in the timeline of the invasion, making the American government push for an all-out military operation (COHA, 2008). The media’s repetition of the official US narrative framed Operation Just Cause as a moral obligation to ensure political stability, not only in Panama but in the Latin American region. The Department of Defense selected fourteen American journalists to cover the events alongside the US military; however, army journalists were favored and had full-access to media coverage while the non-military journalists had restricted access to information (COHA, 2008) but did not contradict the official narratives.
Canal Zone journalism, as it was labelled, offered media framing from American news outlets escorted by the military to cover the United States actions. This mainstream view focused on local gratitude towards the American military, instead of also acknowledging civilian casualties, violation of international law, and the complete destruction of the marginalized neighborhood El Chorrillo, locally referred to as “Little Hiroshima” (Cohen, 1990). The American journalism failed to address Noriega’s former ties with the CIA and the proposed drop in charges. Additionally, the media did not mention the money laundering links of the new Panamanian government. President Endara’s vice-president, Guillermo Ford, co-founded a Miami bank commonly used to launder money from the Medellin Cartel (Cohen, 1990). The newly formed US-backed government was composed of banking elites that opposed the military regime but had their own criminal links.
Human and Social Costs
The most evident factor hidden by official narratives was the civilian casualties from the intervention. The US military estimated 201 civilian deaths, 314 Panamanian military deaths, and 23 American soldier deaths (PHR, 1991). However, the figures were questioned by independent journalists, first aid responders, funeral coordinators, and human rights organizations. For instance, the NGO Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) conducted an investigation and found that reliable information about deaths in combat was scarce due to inadequate forensic procedures, non-admission of journalism in the area, deaths from social unrest and violence, and burials in common graves (PHR, 1991). The PHR concluded that more than 85% of Panamanian deaths were civilian, approximately 300, and 50 deaths from the Panamanian military. In contrast, Operation Just Cause is applauded for its low casualties and consequences. More than 15,000 people were displaced as El Chorrillo was bombed to destroy the headquarters of the Panamanian Defense Forces. Psychological trauma became common among those who experienced suffering, displacement or loss from the invasion (PHR, 1991). Such loss could not justify the downfall of Noriega.
These unseen human costs raise the following question: was Operation Just Cause truly just? A maximalist military operation employed in a densely populated area within a small country to restore democracy in Panama and bring Noriega to justice. This description is not part of the official US perspective; furthermore, none of the alternative perspectives are part of mainstream American narratives of war. The destruction of social infrastructure, displacement of communities, puppet governments and unknown death tolls are constantly erased by the heroism of American military strategy. Nowadays, with Trump’s administration increasing military presence in Venezuela, the thought of a modern-day similar scenario comes to mind. What strategies would the United States apply to justify another military intervention in Latin America, like Operation Just Cause? From an IR perspective, it is important to gather different narratives instead of taking the official as the sole truth, while also deconstructing concepts that appear to be fixed.
